Dynamic optimal taxation with human capital. by Reinhorn,  L. J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
27 November 2009
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Reinhorn, L. J. (2009) ’Dynamic optimal taxation with human capital.’, B.E. journal of macroeconomics., 9
(1). p. 38.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1690.1436
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  
Durham Research Online 
 
Deposited in DRO: 
27 November 2009 
 
Peer-review status: 
Peer-reviewed 
 
Publication status: 
Published version 
 
Citation for published item: 
Reinhorn, L. J. (2009) 'Dynamic optimal taxation with human capital.', B.E. journal of 
macroeconomics., 9 (1). p. 38. 
 
Further information on publisher’s website: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1690.1436 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use policy 
 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior 
permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that : 
 
 a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 a link is made to the metadata record in DRO 
 the full-text is not changed in any way 
 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. 
 
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom 
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 2975 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk 
Dynamic optimal taxation with human capital
Leslie J. Reinhorn
Dept. of Econ. & Finance
University of Durham
23-26 Old Elvet
Durham DH1 3HY
United Kingdom
phone +44 191 334 6365
fax +44 191 334 6341
reinhorn@hotmail.com
22 May 2003
Preliminary. Do not cite or distribute without author’s consent.
1
Abstract
This paper enhances the dynamic optimal taxation results of Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993, 1997).
They use a growth model with human capital and find that optimal taxes on both capital income and
labor income converge to zero in steady state. For one of the models under consideration, I show that
the representative household’s problem does not have an interior solution. This raises concerns since these
corners are inconsistent with aggregate data. Interiority is restored if preferences are modified so that human
capital augments the marginal utility of leisure. With this change, the optimal tax problem is analyzed and,
reassuringly, the Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi results are confirmed: neither capital income nor labor income
should be taxed in steady state.
JEL Classification: H21
Keywords: dynamic optimal taxation, human capital
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1 Introduction
In seminal papers, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that capital income should not be taxed
in steady state. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993, 1997) (hereafter JMR) extend this result to show that
labor income should also be free from taxation in the limit. JMR add human capital to the model to derive
their remarkable results. A key part of the analysis involves the manipulation of the household’s first order
conditions. However, it will be shown below that for a popular class of models nested within the JMR
framework, the household’s problem does not have an interior optimum: Given any interior solution to the
first order conditions, there always exists a feasible variation that increases utility. This is of concern since
an aggregative model with corners cannot fit the data. It also invites a closer look at the optimal tax results.
The class of models in which the difficulties arise is derived from Heckman (1976). However, in Heckman’s
original formulation utility depends on effective leisure — human capital multiplied by raw hours of leisure
— while JMR’s utility function depends only on raw leisure.1 If utility is returned to the original Heckman
form, the corners disappear and the standard first order characterization of equilibrium may be used. In this
case, it is shown that the JMR extension of the Judd–Chamley optimal tax result continues to hold. That
is, neither labor income nor capital income should be taxed in the limit.
Section 2 presents the JMR model and demonstrates that the household’s optimum is not interior when
technology has the Heckman specification. Section 3 restores interiority by taking the original Heckman
utility function. With this change, the optimal tax policy is characterized in the limit. Section 4 is a brief
conclusion.
2 Model
First the full JMR (1997) model is presented. Then the Heckman sub-class is considered. The representative
household is a price taker with access to accumulation technologies for both physical capital and human
capital. The optimization problem is
maximize
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nmt − nht)
subject to
∞∑
t=0
pt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht + (1 + τ
m
t )xmt + xkt − (1− τnt )wtzt − (1− τkt )rtkt − (1 + τ ct )Tt] ≤ b0
kt+1 ≤ (1− δk)kt + xkt
ht+1 ≤ (1− δh)ht +G(xht, ht, nht)
zt ≤M(xmt, ht, nmt)
1Ladro´n-de-Guevara et al. (1999) consider similar issues in a related model without taxation. They find that non-convexities
may arise when raw leisure enters the utility function.
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with initial conditions b0, h0, and k0 given. This appears as (P.1) on page 97 of JMR (1997). Utility
depends on consumption ct and hours of leisure. The time endowment is normalized to unity. Hours of
work are divided between the market, nmt, and human capital formation, nht. The purchased good is used
for investment as well as consumption: xht is investment used in the production of human capital, xkt is
investment in physical capital, and xmt is investment used in the production of effective labor. Thus zt is
effective labor. Physical capital is kt; human capital is ht; exogenous lump sum transfers are Tt; the τs are
tax rates; b0 is initial holdings of government debt. Non-negativity conditions apply; however, it is convenient
to allow the household to choose xkt < 0 (physical capital may be sold), though this will never occur in
equilibrium. Current value prices rt and wt, and present value prices pt, are determined in equilibrium.
The depreciation rates δk and δh are given positive parameters. The production functions G and M are
smooth with positive and diminishing marginal products. Both G and M are homogeneous of degree one in
(x, h).
Clearly the physical capital constraint will bind. This can be used to substitute for xkt in the budget
constraint. Then the problem becomes
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nmt − nht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht + (1 + τ
m
t )xmt + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt
− (1− τnt )wtzt − (1− τkt )rtkt − (1 + τ ct )Tt] ≤ b0
ht+1 ≤ (1− δh)ht +G(xht, ht, nht)
zt ≤M(xmt, ht, nmt).
For t ≥ 0 the coefficient of kt+1 in the budget constraint is
pt − pt+1[1− δk + (1− τkt+1)rt+1]. (1)
If there is an interior optimum the household must face prices and taxes such that (1) equals zero for all
t ≥ 0. See (1.d) in JMR (1997). If (1) were positive, kt+1 = 0 would be optimal. If (1) were negative,
kt+1 ↑ ∞ would be optimal. It is worth emphasizing this arbitrage condition for physical capital because its
companion condition for human capital will play a key role in the analysis. Since (1) equals zero, and since
the effective labor constraint clearly binds, the household’s problem becomes
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max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nmt − nht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht + (1 + τ
m
t )xmt − (1− τnt )wtM(xmt, ht, nmt)− (1 + τ ct )Tt]
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0]
ht+1 ≤ (1− δh)ht +G(xht, ht, nht).
2.1 Heckman household technology — no interior optimum
At this point the household’s production functions G and M are specialized as follows: G(xht, ht, nht) =
Gˆ(xht, nhtht) with Gˆ homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments, and M(xmt, ht, nmt) = nmtht. See
Heckman (1976, p. S13) and also JMR (1993, § III). Since xmt is no longer relevant, the household’s problem
now becomes
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nmt − nht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht − (1− τnt )wtnmtht − (1 + τ ct )Tt]
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0]
ht+1 ≤ (1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, nhtht).
The purpose of this section is to show that this problem does not have an interior solution. The method
will be to assume an interior solution and derive a contradiction. The Lagrangian for the problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
{
βtu(ct, 1− nmt − nht)− λpt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht − (1− τnt )wtnmtht]
+ µt[(1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, nhtht)− ht+1]
}
.
If the solution were interior the first order conditions for ct, nmt, nht, xht, and ht+1 respectively would be
βtu1(ct, 1− nmt − nht) = λpt(1 + τ ct ) (2)
βtu2(ct, 1− nmt − nht) = λpt(1− τnt )wtht (3)
βtu2(ct, 1− nmt − nht) = µthtGˆ2(xht, nhtht) (4)
λpt = µtGˆ1(xht, nhtht) (5)
λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1nmt+1 = µt − µt+1[1− δh + nht+1Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)]. (6)
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Again, the goal is to use the first order conditions, and more generally use the assumption of interiority,
to generate a contradiction. From (3), (4), and (5),
Gˆ2(xht, nhtht)/Gˆ1(xht, nhtht) = (1− τnt )wt, t ≥ 0. (7)
This looks very much like the first order condition for a cost minimization problem. Indeed, this is the case.
Let `t = 1− nmt − nht denote hours of leisure. Then the household’s problem can be written as
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, `t)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt[(1 + τ ct )ct + xht − (1− τnt )wtht(1− `t − nht)− (1 + τ ct )Tt]
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0]
ht+1 ≤ (1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, nhtht)
1− `t − nht ≥ 0.
Since h, xh, and nh do not appear in the utility function, they will be chosen to maximize income, i.e., to
minimize
∑∞
t=0 pt[xht − (1 − τnt )wtht(1 − `t − nht)] subject to the human capital accumulation constraint
and the non-negativity of market hours. In particular, for any {`t, ht}∞t=0, the household will choose xht and
nht to minimize xht + (1 − τnt )wthtnht subject to these constraints. This is a standard cost minimization
problem with an upper bound on one of the inputs. Under the maintained assumption that the solution
is interior, it will satisfy (7). Since Gˆ is homogeneous of degree one, the minimized cost is proportional to
“output:” xht + (1− τnt )wthtnht = [ht+1 − (1− δh)ht]ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) where ξ is the unit cost function for
Gˆ(xh, zh).
Substitute the minimized cost back into the budget constraint. The household’s problem becomes
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, `t)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
pt
{
(1 + τ ct )ct + [ht+1 − (1− δh)ht]ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− (1− τnt )wtht(1− `t)− (1 + τ ct )Tt
}
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0].
Collect together the terms with ht and re-write the budget constraint as follows:
p0(1 + τ c0 )(c0 − T0) +
∞∑
t=1
{
pt(1 + τ ct )(ct − Tt)
+ht[pt−1ξ(1, (1− τnt−1)wt−1)− pt(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt(1− τnt )wt(1− `t)]
}
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + p0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0(1− `0)]. (8)
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At an interior optimum, the coefficient of ht in (8) must equal zero:2
pt−1ξ(1, (1− τnt−1)wt−1)− pt(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt(1− τnt )wt(1− `t) = 0, t ≥ 1. (9)
This states that the present value cost of a marginal unit of human capital (pt−1ξt−1) equals its stock value
next period (pt(1− δh)ξt) plus its flow return (pt(1− τnt )wt(nmt+nht)). The flow rate of return is equalized
across market hours and training hours due to the static optimality conditions. But note that the marginal
unit of human capital does not augment the value of leisure hours since human capital does not enter the
utility function (cf. Ladro´n-de-Guevara et al., 1999).
If the expression in (9) were strictly negative (positive), any increase (decrease) in ht would provide more
income for consumption, so optimality and interiority would be incompatible. This is much like the reasoning
associated with (1) above. However, there is a key difference here. There is a choice variable in (9): `t. So
this is not a standard arbitrage condition on prices.
Let the superscript zero denote the hypothesized interior optimum, e.g., `0t . Consider a variation c˜s, ˜`s,
h˜s at a given s ≥ 1.3 Since the interior optimum satisfies (9), and since the variation must also satisfy the
budget constraint (8), it must be that
ps(1+τ cs )c
0
s = ps(1+τ
c
s )c˜s+ h˜s
[
ps−1ξ(1, (1−τns−1)ws−1)−ps(1−δh)ξ(1, (1−τns )ws)−ps(1−τns )ws(1− ˜`s)
]
.
In particular, if ˜`s = `0s + `, then
ps(1 + τ cs )c
0
s = ps(1 + τ
c
s )c˜s + h˜sps(1− τns )ws` (10)
since (9) vanishes at the interior optimum. If also h˜s = h0s + h then (10) yields
c˜s = c0s − (h0s + h)(1− τns )ws`/(1 + τ cs ).
Hence u(c˜s, ˜`s) = u(c0s − (h0s + h)(1− τns )ws`/(1 + τ cs ), `0s + `) and
∂u(c˜s, ˜`s)
∂`
∣∣∣∣∣
`=0
= −(h0s+h)(1−τns )wsu1(c0s, `0s)/(1+τ cs )+u2(c0s, `0s) = −h(1−τns )wsu1(c0s, `0s)/(1+τ cs ) (11)
where the last equality follows from the static interior optimum condition u02/u
0
1 = (1 − τns )wsh0s/(1 + τ cs ),
implied by (2) and (3). From (11), for any h < 0 and for sufficiently small ` > 0, the variation raises
welfare. This is inconsistent with the optimality of the interior solution.4 Thus, the assumption of an
interior optimum leads to a contradiction.
2Lemma A.1 in the appendix confirms that the first order conditions (3)–(6) imply (9).
3I.e., for all t 6= s, consumption, leisure, and human capital remain c0t , `0t , and h0t . Also, note that the variation h˜s induces
variations x˜hs−1, n˜hs−1, x˜hs, n˜hs through the cost minimization problem associated with (7). Similarly, there are induced
variations in n˜ms−1 and n˜ms.
4Another possibility that could prevent the variation from raising utility is ws = 0. But then the household would have no
incentive to do any market work at s: n0ms = 0. Again, this would violate the interiority assumption.
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3 Optimal taxation with Heckman utility
This section revisits the optimal taxation results in JMR (1997). JMR show that both capital and labor
income should not be taxed in the limit. This result is derived from the assumption of an interior solution to
the household’s problem. But as shown in section 2.1 above, the household’s optimum is not interior when
household technology takes the Heckman (1976) form. Interiority may be restored, however, if the household
not only has Heckman technology but also Heckman (1976) utility:
u(ct, (1− nmt − nht)ht).
That is, utility is generated from effective leisure and not merely hours of leisure. With this change, it will
be shown that the JMR result continues to hold: the steady state tax rate is zero for both capital income
and labor income.
3.1 Household’s problem
With the modified utility function, the first order conditions for an interior optimum become
βtu1(ct, (1− nmt − nht)ht) = λpt(1 + τ ct ) (2′)
βtu2(ct, (1− nmt − nht)ht) = λpt(1− τnt )wt (3′)
βtu2(ct, (1− nmt − nht)ht) = µtGˆ2(xht, nhtht) (4′)
λpt = µtGˆ1(xht, nhtht) (5′)
λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1nmt+1 = µt − µt+1[1− δh + nht+1Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)]
− βt+1(1− nmt+1 − nht+1)u2(ct+1, (1− nmt+1 − nht+1)ht+1). (6′)
The analysis of the household’s problem proceeds as in section 2.1. The cost minimization problem
associated with (7) still applies, and hence so does the budget constraint (8). With hours of leisure given by
`t = 1− nmt − nht, the household solves
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, `tht)
s.t. p0(1 + τ c0 )(c0 − T0) +
∞∑
t=1
{
pt(1 + τ ct )(ct − Tt)
+ht[pt−1ξ(1, (1− τnt−1)wt−1)− pt(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt(1− τnt )wt(1− `t)]
}
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + p0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0(1− `0)].
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Unlike the analysis of (8) and (9) above, here the first order conditions do not cause the coefficient of ht in
this budget constraint to vanish. To see this, re-write the budget constraint but separate out the term with
effective leisure:
p0(1 + τ c0 )(c0 − T0) +
∞∑
t=1
{
pt(1 + τ ct )(ct − Tt) + pt(1− τnt )wt`tht
+ht[pt−1ξ(1, (1− τnt−1)wt−1)− pt(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt(1− τnt )wt]
}
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + p0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0(1− `0)]. (12)
At an interior optimum, the coefficient of ht in the second line of (12) must equal zero:5
pt−1ξ(1, (1− τnt−1)wt−1)− pt(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt(1− τnt )wt = 0, t ≥ 1. (13)
This is based on a standard arbitrage argument. E.g., if the expression in (13) were negative, any increase in
ht would provide more income for consumption. And this increase in ht could be matched with a reduction
in `t to leave effective leisure unchanged — both in the first line of (12) and also in the utility function. The
key distinction between (13) and the more problematic (9) is the presence of the choice variable `t in the
latter. By contrast, in (13) the flow return to a marginal unit of human capital, pt(1− τnt )wt, applies to all
hours, even leisure, due to the Heckman specification for preferences.
Given (13), the household’s problem is (after re-arranging)
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, `tht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
[
pt(1 + τ ct )(ct − Tt) + pt(1− τnt )wt`tht
]
≤ b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + p0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0].
This is a completely standard dynamic utility maximization problem with choice variables ct and z`t := `tht.
The first order conditions are (2′) and (3′).
In summary, for t ≥ 0 the conditions for a household optimum are as follows:
pt/pt+1 = 1− δk + (1− τkt+1)rt+1 (1′)
Gˆ2(xht, nhtht)/Gˆ1(xht, nhtht) = (1− τnt )wt (7)
ptξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)− pt+1(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τnt+1)wt+1)− pt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1 = 0 (13)
5Lemma A.2 in the appendix confirms that the first order conditions (3′)–(6′) imply (13).
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βtu1(ct, `tht) = λpt(1 + τ ct ) (2
′)
βtu2(ct, `tht) = λpt(1− τnt )wt (3′)
kt+1 = (1− δk)kt + xkt (14)
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, nhtht) (15)
1 = `t + nmt + nht (16)
∞∑
t=0
[
pt(1 + τ ct )(ct − Tt) + pt(1− τnt )wt`tht
]
= b0 + p0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + p0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0]. (17)
3.2 Equilibrium
The optimal tax problem is to select the equilibrium that gives the greatest utility to the household. In
addition to the household’s optimality conditions, equilibrium is characterized by the firms’ optimality
conditions and by goods market clearing (details below).
It is convenient to express the equilibrium entirely in terms of primal variables — quantities rather than
prices. Thus some of the household’s optimality conditions may be regarded as definitions of after tax prices,
for a given allocation. Specifically, (7) defines the after tax wage, then (13) defines the price ratio pt/pt+1:
pt
pt+1
= (1− δh)
ξ(1, (1− τnt+1)wt+1)
ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)
+
Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)/Gˆ1(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)
. (18)
Since ξ is the unit cost function for Gˆ, the cost minimizers satisfy
Gˆ(xht, nhtht)ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) = xht + nhtht(1− τnt )wt
= xht + nhtht
Gˆ2(xht, nhtht)
Gˆ1(xht, nhtht)
=
Gˆ(xht, nhtht)
Gˆ1(xht, nhtht)
where the last line follows from homogeneity. Therefore ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) = 1/Gˆ1(xht, nhtht) and (18) yields
pt
pt+1
=
Gˆ1(xht, nhtht)
Gˆ1(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
(
1− δh + Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
)
, t ≥ 0. (19)
With this result, (1′) then defines the after tax interest rate for t ≥ 1. Note that p0 and (1 − τk0 )r0 are
not restricted. Also, (2′) at t ≥ 1 divided by (2′) at time 0 yields τ ct , but τ c0 is unrestricted at this point.
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(Footnote 6 will identify τ c0 .) Equation (3
′) presents a real restriction since the after tax wage and the present
value price pt have already been determined. From (3′) and (7),
u2(ct, `tht)
βu2(ct+1, `t+1ht+1)
=
Gˆ2(xht, nhtht)/Gˆ1(xht, nhtht)
Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)/Gˆ1(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
· pt
pt+1
=
Gˆ2(xht, nhtht)
Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
(
1− δh + Gˆ2(xht+1, nht+1ht+1)
)
, t ≥ 0 (20)
where the second line follows from (19).6 This is analogous to the restriction φ(vt−1, vt) = 0 in problem (P.2)
on page 100 of JMR (1997).
In order to express the budget constraint (17) in primal form, multiply through by the Lagrange multiplier
λ and use (2′) and (3′) to get
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(ct − Tt)u1(ct, `tht) + `thtu2(ct, `tht)
]
= λb0 + λp0k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + λp0h0[(1− δh)ξ(1, (1− τn0 )w0) + (1− τn0 )w0]
=
u2(0)Gˆ1(0)
Gˆ2(0)
{
b0/p0 + k0[1− δk + (1− τk0 )r0] + h0[(1− δh) + Gˆ2(0)]/Gˆ1(0)
}
(21)
where the last line uses (3′) and (7) at t = 0 to substitute for λ, and also uses previous results to substitute
for terms with (1− τn0 )w0.
The other equilibrium conditions are that firms are price taking profit maximizers and that the goods
market clears. The production function F for the purchased good is homogeneous of degree one in physical
capital and effective labor. Thus profits will be zero. For t ≥ 0,
F1(kt, nmtht) = rt (22)
F2(kt, nmtht) = wt (23)
F (kt, nmtht) = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + xht + gt. (24)
In (24), government purchases, gt, are exogenously given. Also, (24) subsumes the physical capital accumu-
lation equation (14). Equations (22) and (23) do not impose constraints on the primal form of the optimal
tax problem. They can be used to define the before tax interest rate and wage.
Thus, in terms of primal variables, equilibrium is characterized by (15), (16), (20), (21), and (24). In
the last line of (21), p0 and τk0 are unrestricted while r0 is defined by (22). By Walras’ law, when these
conditions are satisfied the government’s infinite horizon present value budget constraint is redundant.
6It appears (3′) also presents a restriction at time 0. From (7), (2′), and (3′) at t = 0, u2(c0, `0h0)/u1(c0, `0h0) =
(1+ τc0 )
−1Gˆ2(xh0, nh0h0)/Gˆ1(xh0, nh0h0). However, this is not a restriction. Rather, it can be used to define τc0 since (2
′) left
τc0 available.
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3.3 Optimal tax problem
The tax problem is not particularly interesting if the government can confiscate initial wealth. Thus it is
customary to assign reasonable exogenous values to p0 and τk0 in (21). Let zmt := nmtht and zht := nhtht
denote effective labor for the market and for human capital accumulation. The tax problem is as follows:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht − zmt − zht)
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(ct − Tt)u1(ct, ht − zmt − zht) + (ht − zmt − zht)u2(ct, ht − zmt − zht)
]
= A0
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, zht)
F (kt, zmt) = ct + kt+1 − (1− δk)kt + xht + gt
u2(ct, ht − zmt − zht)
βu2(ct+1, ht+1 − zmt+1 − zht+1) =
Gˆ2(xht, zht)
Gˆ2(xht+1, zht+1)
(
1− δh + Gˆ2(xht+1, zht+1)
)
where A0 in the first constraint denotes the last line of (21). Let θ be the Lagrange multiplier for the first
constraint. As in JMR (1997), introduce the auxiliary function
W (ct, ht − zmt − zht, Tt, θ) :=
u(ct, ht − zmt − zht) + θ
[
(ct − Tt)u1(ct, ht − zmt − zht) + (ht − zmt − zht)u2(ct, ht − zmt − zht)
]
.
Then the Lagrangian for the problem is
L = −θA0 +
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
W (ct, ht − zmt − zht, Tt, θ) + ν1t[(1− δh)ht + Gˆ(xht, zht)− ht+1]
+ ν2t[F (kt, zmt)− ct − kt+1 + (1− δk)kt − xht]
+ ν3t
[
u2(ct, ht − zmt − zht)
u2(ct+1, ht+1 − zmt+1 − zht+1) −
β(1− δh)Gˆ2(xht, zht)
Gˆ2(xht+1, zht+1)
− βGˆ2(xht, zht)
]}
.
Suppose the optimal tax equilibrium converges to an interior steady state in which all variables have
finite limits, including Lagrange multipliers. Let asterisks denote steady state values. Then in the limit the
first order conditions for ct, ht, zmt, zht, xht, and kt yield
W ∗1 − ν∗2 + (1− β−1)ν∗3u∗21/u∗2 = 0 (25)
W ∗2 + (1− δh)ν∗1 − β−1ν∗1 + (1− β−1)ν∗3u∗22/u∗2 = 0 (26)
−W ∗2 + ν∗2F ∗2 − (1− β−1)ν∗3u∗22/u∗2 = 0 (27)
−W ∗2 + ν∗1 Gˆ∗2 − (1− β−1)ν∗3
(
u∗22/u
∗
2 + β(1− δh)Gˆ∗22/Gˆ∗2
)− βν∗3 Gˆ∗22 = 0 (28)
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ν∗1 Gˆ
∗
1 − ν∗2 − (1− β−1)ν∗3β(1− δh)Gˆ∗21/Gˆ∗2 − βν∗3 Gˆ∗21 = 0 (29)
ν∗2 (F
∗
1 + 1− δk)− β−1ν∗2 = 0. (30)
The main result may now be stated.
Theorem If ν∗2 6= 0 then the steady state tax rate is zero for both capital income and labor income.
Proof The Chamley–Judd result that τk∗ = 0 is straightforward. If ν∗2 6= 0, (30) yields F ∗1 + 1− δk = β−1.
From (19) and (20), pt/pt+1 converges to β−1. Hence (1′) yields 1 − δk + (1 − τk∗)r∗ = β−1. Since r = F1
from (22), the result follows.
Next it will be shown that ν∗3 = 0. This will then be used to prove τ
n∗ = 0. Add (26) and (28) to get
ν∗1 (1− δh + Gˆ∗2 − β−1) + βν∗3 Gˆ∗22[(β−1 − 1)(1− δh)/Gˆ∗2 − 1] = 0.
In steady state, (20) yields β−1 = 1− δh+ Gˆ∗2. Hence βν∗3 Gˆ∗22[(β−1− 1)(1− δh)/Gˆ∗2− 1] = 0. Since δh 6= 0,
it follows that ν∗3 = 0.
Finally it will be shown that τn∗ = 0. With ν∗3 = 0 and ν
∗
2 6= 0, (29) implies ν∗1 6= 0. Thus (28) and (29)
yield Gˆ∗2/Gˆ
∗
1 = W
∗
2 /ν
∗
2 , while (27) yields W
∗
2 /ν
∗
2 = F
∗
2 . Hence Gˆ
∗
2/Gˆ
∗
1 = F
∗
2 . And from (7) and (23), this is
precisely the condition under which τn∗ = 0.
4 Conclusion
For the model in section 2.1, the household’s problem fails to have an interior optimum. Thus, this model is
not well suited for the analysis of optimal taxation. With the modification to utility in section 3, interiority
is restored and the optimal tax problem yields the JMR (1997) result: neither labor income nor capital
income should be taxed in steady state.
The intuition for the Judd–Chamley zero capital tax result is based on the idea that a tax on capital
income is a tax on future consumption. This creates a distortionary wedge between the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for consumption and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. This
wedge grows exponentially through time — just like compound interest (Judd, 2002). Hence even a small
capital income tax can generate large distortions if it is left in place a long time.
When human capital is present, similar reasoning applies. The accumulation technology for human
capital creates an additional channel through which taxation can potentially cause explosive intertemporal
distortions. Hence, at an optimal steady state, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for effective
leisure will equal the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. In terms of the model, this implies
that constraint (20) will automatically be satisfied at an optimal steady state. Since this constraint does
not bind, in the limit the economy behaves as if there were no restrictions on the tax instruments.7 Thus
7Equation (20) is an instrument restriction. It imposes the same tax rates on both the consumer and the human capital
producer.
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the Diamond–Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem applies: Marginal rates of transformation must
be equal in the two production sectors, human capital and physical capital/consumption. Inspection of (7)
and (23) reveals that this efficiency condition yields a zero tax rate on labor income. In the limit, this tax
must vanish; otherwise the two production sectors would face different relative prices.
Finally, given the problems with non-interiority that were considered here, one is led to wonder if other
human capital models may lead to similar difficulties.8 It seems that caution is warranted in these situations.
8Ortigueira and Santos (2002) use a continuous time model with human capital and find that equilibrium is characterized
by corners for some parameter values and tax rates.
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Appendix
A.1 Lemma If (3)–(6) are satisfied for all t ≥ 0 with λ 6= 0 then (9) must hold for all t ≥ 1.
Proof Use (3) and (4) to substitute for µt+1Gˆ2(t+ 1) in (6):
λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1nmt+1 = µt − µt+1(1− δh)− λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1nht+1, t ≥ 0.
Therefore, since `t+1 + nmt+1 + nht+1 = 1,
0 = µt − µt+1(1− δh)− λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1(1− `t+1), t ≥ 0
or
0 = µt−1 − µt(1− δh)− λpt(1− τnt )wt(1− `t), t ≥ 1.
A comparison with (9) shows that the lemma will be proved if µt/λ = ptξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) for all t ≥ 0. Recall
that ξ was defined to be the unit cost function for the production function Gˆ. Therefore,
ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)Gˆ(xht, nhtht) = xht + (1− τnt )wtnhtht, t ≥ 0 (31)
at an interior optimum. Multiply both sides of (4) by nht, and both sides of (5) by xht, then add:
nhtλpt(1− τnt )wtht + xhtλpt = µtGˆ(xht, nhtht), t ≥ 0
by (3) and homogeneity of Gˆ. Compare this with (31) to get λptξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) = µt as required.
A.2 Lemma If (3′)–(6′) are satisfied for all t ≥ 0 with λ 6= 0 then (13) must hold for all t ≥ 1.
Proof Use (4′) to substitute for µt+1Gˆ2(t+ 1) in (6′), then simplify to get
λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1nmt+1 = µt − µt+1(1− δh)
− βt+1(1− nmt+1)u2(ct+1, (1− nmt+1 − nht+1)ht+1), t ≥ 0.
Next, use (3′) to substitute for βt+1u2(t+ 1), then simplify to get
0 = µt − µt+1(1− δh)− λpt+1(1− τnt+1)wt+1, t ≥ 0
or
0 = µt−1 − µt(1− δh)− λpt(1− τnt )wt, t ≥ 1.
A comparison with (13) shows that the lemma will be proved if µt/λ = ptξ(1, (1−τnt )wt) for all t ≥ 0. Recall
that ξ was defined to be the unit cost function for the production function Gˆ. Therefore,
ξ(1, (1− τnt )wt)Gˆ(xht, nhtht) = xht + (1− τnt )wtnhtht, t ≥ 0 (32)
at an interior optimum. Multiply both sides of (4′) by nhtht, and both sides of (5′) by xht, then add:
nhthtλpt(1− τnt )wt + xhtλpt = µtGˆ(xht, nhtht), t ≥ 0
by (3′) and homogeneity of Gˆ. Compare this with (32) to get λptξ(1, (1− τnt )wt) = µt as required.
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